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Plaintiffs Jeff Christensen and Kyle James Fausett submit the 
following Reply Memorandum in support of this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the Brief of Appellants, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett 
challenged Defendant Burns to demonstrate that this case has no genuine 
issues of material fact and that it is entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. Defendant Burns' brief fails to answer this challenge. Thus, 
for example, in response to the assertion that it lacks the facts necessary to 
support its motion, Burns adds four more statements and alters the 
wording of the other six. However, Defendant still furnishes only a 
smattering of facts which simply fail to outline Ms. Swenson's scope of 
employment. Since the critical issue in this case concerns whether Ms. 
Swenson acted within the scope of employment while on a short break, the 
Court must consider the employer's policies and instructions involving 
breaks from work, as well as employee practice on these matters. 
"The burden of showing that there is no 'genuine issue of material 
fact' rests with the party seeking a summary judgment in its favor." 
Singer v. Wadman. 595 F. Supp. 188, 269 (D. Utah 1982). In their Brief of 
Appellants, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett cite testimony from the 
depositions to refute various facts presented by Defendant. Instead of 
responding to each of these charges, Defendant Burns merely selects a few 
of Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's facts and attacks them, all the while 
maintaining that no dispute exists. Moreover, three of the four new facts 
which Defendant added in its Brief of Appellee are either misleading or 
inadequate. 
Besides failing to establish the lack of factual disputes, Defendant 
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also fails to establish that it is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. The 
facts simply demonstrate that Ms. Swenson planned and carried out her 
visit to the Frontier Cafe in a manner suited to her employer's convenience. 
Therefore, it cannot be said that she acted in a wholly personal endeavor. 
If anything, the short break she took to pick up a cup of soup was merely 
incidental to job responsibilities. 
In outlining the second criterion under the Clover/Birkner analysis, 
Defendant emphasizes that an employee must be within the normal spatial 
boundaries of employment. This clearly is not the standard. As the Clover 
Court emphasized, the employee need only be substantially within those 
boundaries. Not only does Defendant distort the Clover/Birkner analysis, it 
also mischaracterizes Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's arguments made 
on this point. Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett do not argue that in the 
Clover case Mr. Zulliger's duties restricted him to one restaurant, nor do 
they argue that the Clover Court ignored this alleged fact. To the contrary, 
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett acknowledge that Mr. Zulliger's duties took 
him to both restaurants. They emphasize, however, that the accident 
occurred at a some distance away from the locale of his responsibilities 
and that the Clover Court did not find this departure significant. Similarly, 
in this case, Ms. Swenson brief departure from the area of her duties does 
not take her outside the "substantial normal spatial boundaries." 
Finally, Defendant argues that the second trip test must be applied in 
this case. It does not make sense to apply this test every time an 
employee deviates from his or her immediate work responsibilities. Thus 
for example, whether an employee takes a latrine break, gets up to stretch, 
or walks to the vending machine to buy a cup of soup, it would be 
ridiculous to ask if a second person would need to make the same trip. 
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These incidental actions of the employee briefly attending to personal 
comfort needs do not take him or her out of the scope of employment. 
Whether as an incidental action or under the personal detour approach, 
Ms. Swenson could not be said to have totally abandoned her 
responsibilities. Carter v. Bessey. 97 Utah 427, 93 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 
1939) ("A slight deviation from order or attending incidentally to other 
business than the master's, but which does not dissever the servant from 
the master's business does not relieve the master from liability for the 
servant's negligence."). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: DEFENDANT BURNS FAILS IN ITS 'STATEMENT OF 
RELEVANT FACTS' TO RESOLVE THE FACTUAL CONFLICT IN 
THIS CASE. 
In its Brief of Appellee, Defendant Burns offers a Statement of 
Relevant Facts with the alleged purpose of "adding to the Statement of 
Facts set forth in Appellants' Brief." (Brief of Appellee at 3). Rather than 
merely adding to Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's account of the events, 
however, Defendant's Statement of Relevant Facts serves to cement the 
conflict and dispute over the facts in this case. In response to the 
argument that Defendant's list of facts is inadequate, Burns not only alters 
the wording of its original six statements, it also adds four more facts. 
Even with these additions, however, Defendant's statement of facts stands 
incomplete, and in dispute. 
Thus, for example, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett point to new fact 
8 as inaccurate and misleading. There Defendant states that Ms. Swenson 
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admitted that picking up a cup of soup was a personal choice. (Brief of 
Appellee at 4). However, when asked again and pushed to admit that 
obtaining the soup involved a personal choice, Ms. Swenson finally 
responded "I guess if you are hungry, that's your choice." (Swenson Depo. 
at 24, lines 6-7, attached as Addendum 1). More importantly, this 
statement does not mean that Ms. Swenson viewed her actions as 
abandoning work. In fact, when asked if she believed she was on a 
personal errand, Ms. Swenson testified: "No. I was doing my job." 
(Swenson Depo. at 23, lines 16-19, Addendum 1). 
Similarly, Defendant's new facts 2 and 3 give only part of the 
material information in this case. In these statements, Defendant attempts 
to limit Ms. Swenson's scope of employment to actions that take place 
solely within the geographical boundaries of the Geneva Plant. (Brief of 
the Appellee at 3). As discussed in Point 2B of Appellants' Brief, and Point 
3 of this brief, the test ior scope of employment not only encompasses 
actions on the premises, but also those substantially within the spatial 
boundaries. Hence, while Defendant's statements setting out those 
boundaries may reflect the truth, they do not provide the whole picture. 
Not only does Defendant furnish disputed facts, 1 it also challenges 
the facts in this case by directly attacking some of the facts offered by Mr. 
Christensen and Mr. Fausett. (Brief of Appellee at 6, stating that 
"Appellants' Statement of Facts are mischaracterized, misleading or 
immaterial ...."). As the evidence demonstrates, Defendant cannot discount 
the facts while maintaining that no dispute exists. 
1 Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett challenge Defendant's original statement of facts in the 
Brief of Appellant, Point 1. 
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Defendant's assault on Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's Statement 
of the Facts comes in two forms. First, Defendant tries to discredit the facts 
which concern actions taken by employees in Ms. Swenson's role, i.e., gate 
guards. Second, Defendant endeavors to eliminate facts involving the use 
of the Frontier Cafe by Burns employees other than gate guards. 
The latter part of statement 13 illustrates Defendant's direct attack 
on the role of gate guards. There, Defendant disputes Mr. Christensen and 
Mr. Fausett's claim that Ms. Swenson and other guards checked with each 
other before ordering lunch and that they occasionally brought lunches 
back for those who ordered. (Brief of Appellee at 7). While admitting that 
Ms. Swenson distributed lunches to guards at the gates, Defendant argues 
that she did so only as a rover, on graveyard shift, and only after the 
accident. (Id..) 
The depositions describe, however, that even before the day of the 
collision the gate guards inquired with each other when ordering and 
picking up lunches. Specifically, on page 55 of her deposition, Ms. Swenson 
confirms that "people at Gate 4 would take turns to go over to the Frontier 
Cafe and pick up lunches for each other." (See Exhibit 5, Brief of 
Appellants). Moreover, she testified that the guards sometimes walked 
across the street for this task and sometimes drove. (Id.) 
In statement 14, to support of its position that the gate guards did 
not pick up lunches for each other, Defendant refers to Oreon Olsen's 
deposition in which he claims that he doesn't recall any of the guards 
bringing back food from Frontier Cafe to other guards. (See Exhibit 4, Brief 
of Appellants, Olsen Depo. at 27-28). However, Ms. Swenson's testimony 
disputes this, as shown in the preceding paragraph. Furthermore, Mr. 
Olsen himself testifies later in his deposition that "I could go over and get a 
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lunch or have someone pick it up" (See Exhibit 4, Brief of Appellants, 
Olsen Depo. at 33, lines 6-7, emphasis added). In addition, although he 
refused her offer, Ms. Swenson testified that on the day of the accident she 
checked with Mr. Olsen to see if he wanted her to bring back lunch for him. 
(See Exhibit 5, Brief of Appellants, Swenson Depo. at 17, lines 21-23). 
In statement 17, Defendant refers to Eugene Bezzant's deposition to 
establish that the gate guards considered a visit to Frontier Cafe to pick up 
lunch as a personal errand. (Brief of Appellee at 8). Yet, as discussed 
above, Ms. Swenson emphatically rejected this position. She considered 
the task as part of her job. ("I was doing my job." Swenson Depo. at 23, 
lines 16-19, Addendum 1). 
Finally in statement 18, Defendant disputes Mr. Christensen and Mr. 
Fausett's claim that Burns Management knew that the gate guards used 
Frontier Cafe for breaks. (Brief of Appellee at 8, arguing that Mr. 
Transtrum observed such use among rovers only.) Eugene Bezzant 
testified, however, that the management knew because, "occasionally they 
would come to the gate at the time we were at the place picking up a lunch 
or whatever we were picking up." (See Exhibit 7, Brief of Appellants, 
Bezzant Depo. at 18, lines 14-23). Moreover, when asked whether the 
management knew that the guards used their own vehicles to "hustle over" 
to the Frontier Cafe, Ms. Swenson declared, "I'm sure they did." (See 
Exhibit 5, Brief of Appellants, Swenson Depo. at 55, lines 18-22). In 
addition, Ms. Swenson reaffirmed that the management must have known 
that prior to the accident, Burns employees, including gate guards, used 
Frontier Cafe. ("I'm sure they did. The lieutenants themselves went 
there." See Exhibit 5, Brief of Appellants, Swenson Depo at 43, 15-20). 
Not only does Defendant dispute Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's 
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facts concerning the role of the Frontier Cafe in relation to gate guards, it 
also attempts to exclude the link between other Burns employees and the 
Cafe. Specifically, Defendant labels the relationship between the Cafe and 
rovers, management, and those on other than day shifts as immaterial. As 
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett argued in their previous brief, these facts 
are material. They serve to define the arena in which Ms. Swenson's scope 
of employment exists. 
Consequently, contrary to Defendant's position in its Brief of 
Appellee, material facts include the following uses of the Frontier Cafe: 
1) Ms. Swenson brought food back from the Frontier Cafe to her 
lieutenant while on graveyard shift (Brief of Appellee at 6); 
2) rovers picked up lunches from the Frontier Cafe for single staffed 
posts (Brief of Appellee at 6-7); 
3) company officials from Salt Lake City held meetings with 
lieutenants at the Frontier Cafe (Brief of Appellee at 7); 
4) lieutenants picked up food from the Frontier Cafe for meetings 
with lieutenants and captains (Brief of Appellee at 8); and 
5) Captain Transtrum observed rovers using Frontier Cafe for lunch 
and latrine breaks (Brief of Appellee at 8). 
Each of these admitted facts, plus the numerous others already cited 
by Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett in the Brief of Appellants, come 
together to create an impression in the minds of Burns employees. 
Through their use of the Cafe, in official, semi-official, and casual ways, 
Burns employees endow it as an extension of their workplace, much like a 
company cafeteria. Hence, facts on how Burns generally used the Frontier 
Cafe are important, as Defendant notes, in determining the legal rights of 
the parties and to establish liability of the employer. (Brief of Appellee at 
7 
10-11). 
Finally, in their Brief of Appellants, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett 
refer to and quote from testimony in the depositions to refute the original 
facts provided by Defendant. Defendant simply fails to respond to most of 
these charges. (See, e.g.. Brief of Appellants at 7-8, attacking original fact 
6). 
POINT 2: MS. SWENSON ACTED FOR THE CONVENIENCE OF HER 
EMPLOYER AND THUS HER VISIT TO THE FRONTIER CAFE 
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED WHOLLY A PERSONAL ENDEAVOR. 
Incredibly, Defendant argues that Ms. Swenson's visit to the Frontier 
Cafe was wholly "a matter of personal convenience." (Brief of Appellee at 
14.). Ignoring the following factors, Defendant persists in maintaining that 
Burns had no control or influence in Ms. Swenson's actions: 
1. Burns gave no scheduled breaks. 
2. The company provided no place on the premises for employees to 
purchase their food. 
3. The company expected its employees to work as much as possible 
throughout their shifts but paid them during any breaks taken. 
4. On the day of the collision, Ms. Swenson waited for a slow time in 
her responsibilities. 
5. Following company practice, she checked to see if fellow-guard 
Oreon Olsen wanted something to eat. 
6. Ms. Swenson telephoned the nearest food facility using a menu 
posted at Gate 4. 
7. She ordered a cup of soup and then drove across the street in 
order to be back at Gate 4 as quickly as possible. 
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8. She stayed only long enough to pay for the soup. 
9. She intended to bring the soup back to her post rather than eat it 
at the cafe. 
Obviously, if Ms. Swenson had taken her lunch break as a matter of 
personal convenience, she might of at the very least taken more time, 
eaten at the cafe, or even selected a different time, or place, or manner of 
transportation. In fact, as both Ms. Swenson's direct supervisor, Kim 
Hancey, and her captain, Mike Transtrum, testified: a Burns employee 
taking a lunch break benefits the company. (Hancey Depo. at 50, lines 21 
though 51, line 10, attached as Addendum 2; Transtrum Depo. at 80, line 
16 through 82, line 3, attached as Addendum 3). Although it might be 
argued that a lunch break benefits the employer no matter what the 
circumstances, in this case where Ms. Swenson planned and conducted her 
hurried break specifically out of concern for and at the convenience of her 
employer, the break becomes merely incidental to work. 
Even with personal acts, many courts have held that when this 
conduct is tied to the workplace, it falls within the scope of employment. 
As the court in Travelers Ins. Co. v. SCM Corp., explained: 
In determining the scope of employment for purposes of 
the respondeat superior doctrine, courts have long considered 
certain "personal" activities to be so necessary, usual, and 
closely tied in to the workplace that they are considered to be 
within the scope of employment. See, e.g.. Brown v. Anzalone, 
300 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1962) (lighting a fire to say warm); 
George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co.. 33 Cal.2d 834, 205 P.2d 
1037 (1949) (smoking); J.C. Pennev Co. v. McLaughlin. 137 Fla. 
594, 188 So. 785 (1939) (going to restroom). 
600 F. Supp. 493, 500 (D.D.C 1984). Similarly, in Alma v. Oakland Unified 
School Dist.. the court stated that acts necessary to an employee's "comfort, 
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convenience, health, and welfare while at work, though strictly personal," 
do not take him or her outside the scope of employment. 176 Cal. Rptr. 
287, 289 (Cal Ct. App. 1981). 
Nonetheless, Defendant argues that it did not direct Ms. Swenson to 
go to the cafe nor were there duties for her to perform there. 
Consequently, Defendant asserts, she must have been on a personal errand 
completely outside the scope of employment. Under this reasoning, 
however, every small departure would be a personal errand outside the 
scope of employment. As noted in the preceding paragraph, the cases 
simply reject such a strict standard. See also. DeMirjian v. Ideal Heating 
Corp.. 278 P.2d 114, 118 (Cal. Dist C. App. 1955) ("Cessation of work for 
eating, drinking, warming himself, and similar necessities are necessary 
incidents of employment."). 
Moreover, Defendant's attempt to classify Ms. Swenson's rushed 
break as wholly a personal errand ignores the plain facts in Clover v. 
Snowbird Resort. 808 P. 2d 1037 (Utah 1991). There, the employer 
instructed the employee to check on a restaurant part way up the ski 
slope. After performing his duties, and in a different locale, the employee 
engaged in personal skiing and at that time collided with another skier. 
Like Ms. Swenson, the employee in Clover received no directives to ski to 
another part of the mountain, nor did he have duties that would require 
him to continue skiing for four additional runs. At the time of the collision, 
the Clover employee clearly was not on company business. Nonetheless, 
the Utah Supreme Court found that neither was he wholly on a personal 
errand. Id. at 1041. 
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POINT 3: DEFENDANT BURNS MISCHARACTERIZES THE SECOND 
CRITERION OF THE BIRKNER/CLOVER TEST AND PLAINTIFFS' 
ARGUMENT. 
Defendant's position throughout this case has been that Ms. Swenson 
left the physical boundaries of the Geneva plant and therefore cannot be 
found within the scope of her employment. In attacking Mr. Christensen 
and Mr. Fausett's arguments on this point, Burns asserts that "[i]t would be 
disingenuous for plaintiffs to argue that the normal spatial boundaries of 
the employment of Ms. Swenson were beyond the physical boundaries of 
the Geneva plant ...." (Brief of Appellee at 17, emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, however, 
explicitly rejected the narrow standard now advocated by Defendant. 
There, like Defendant in this case, Mrs. Clover argued for a holding that 
employees who have fixed places of work should be considered acting 
outside of their employment when off the employer's premises. 808 P.2d 
1037, 1043 (Utah 1991). The court declined to adopt the approach, noting 
that to do so would focus the analysis on one criterion to the exclusion of 
the other two criteria listed in Birkner. IdL Instead, the Court held that an 
employee need only be substantially within the normal spatial boundaries 
of his or her employment. IdL. at 1040. In other words, an employee may 
act outside the physical parameters of employment and still be 
substantially within its boundaries, and hence, within the scope of 
employment. 
In addition to mischaracterizing the second criterion of the 
Birkner/Clover test, Defendant also falsely summarizes Mr. Christensen 
and Mr. Fausett's arguments. In referring to their analysis of the Clover 
case, Burns claims that "Plaintiffs mistakenly argue that the Supreme Court 
1 1 
ignored the fact that Mr. Zulliger's spatial boundaries restricted him to the 
Plaza Restaurant." It also points out that the Court recognized that Mr. 
Zulliger had responsibilities at both the Plaza and the Mid-Gad restaurants. 
(Brief of Appellee at 17). Significantly, Defendant fails to cite the pages in 
the brief where Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett make this argument. 
In actuality, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett explicitly refer to the 
Court's recognition that Mr. Zulliger had duties at both restaurants. See 
Brief of Appellants at 17 ("On the day of the accident, the Court found it 
important that Mr. Zulliger had been following instructions to inspect the 
second restaurant . . . ."); and 21 (The Court pointed out that Mr. Zulliger 
"was on property owned by his employer and at times he had been asked 
to monitor the other restaurant when not working .. . ."). In fact, this 
element is essential to Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett's point, which 
Defendant appears to have missed. The brief explains that Mr. Zulliger had 
completed his duties at both of these restaurants and the collision with 
Mrs. Clover occurred at a spot above either restaurant. (Brief of 
Appellants at 21; Clover, 808 P.2d at 1042.). Nonetheless, even though 
Mr. Zulliger no longer attended to duties at either restaurant and was no 
longer in their immediate vicinity, the Court still held that he was 
substantially within the normal boundaries of his employment.2 
2 Defendant provides no support for its unusual premise that the "entire Snowbird Ski 
Resort" constitutes the normal spatial boundaries of employment for chefs at the resort's 
restaurants. (Brief of Appellee at 17). By contrast, the Utah Supreme Court merely holds that 
while skiing, Mr. Zulliger was substantially within those boundaries. Clover. 808 P.2d at 
1042. 
Moreover, nowhere in the Clover opinion does the Court hold that Mr. Zulliger's normal 
job included "skiing the slopes." (Brief of Appellee at 17). The most that can be drawn from 
the Court's opinion is that employees skied as a mode of travel between the restaurants. Clover. 
808 P.2d at 1043. And, when he collided with Mrs. Clover, Mr. Zulliger was not between the 
two restaurants. Jd. at 1042. It simply does not fit the facts to argue, as Defendant has, that 
Snowbird hired Mr. Zulliger to ski outside the areas between the two restaurants. 
12 
Furthermore, based upon its treatment of the working hours in 
C l o v e r , the Utah Supreme Court clearly rejected a rigid rule for 
determining whether an employee acts substantially within the normal 
boundaries of employment. In Clover . Mr. Zulliger had arrived at the 
resort in order to spend time skiing before his normal working hours. 
Clover. 808 P.2d at 1039. Once there, his employer asked him to check 
the second restaurant, and after doing so he began to ski on his own time. 
The Court noted that Mr. Zulliger was heading down the mountain to 
"begin" work. IcL at 1039. That is, he was not within the normal hours of 
his employment. 
POINT 4: THE SECOND TRIP TEST DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE 
Defendant argues that Ms. Swenson's conduct in visiting the Frontier 
Cafe was not motivated in part by the purpose of serving her employer. 
(Brief of Appellee at 20). To analyze Ms. Swenson's motivations, Defendant 
contends that the Court must use the second trip test. (Id. at 20-21). As 
the Utah Supreme Court in C lover noted, this test is useful when an 
employee travels away from work with both a personal and a business 
motive. 808 P.2d at 1041, cit ing Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life 
Insurance. 801 P.2d 934 (Utah 1989). Thus, for example, the employee in 
W h i t e h e a d was commuting to home when he became involved in an 
accident that injured the plaintiff. In those type of circumstances, the 
court asks whether the employer would have had to send another 
employee over the same route or to perform the same task if the trip had 
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not been made. id. 
Nothing constrains a court to use the second trip test. In fact, as the 
Clover court emphasized, this variation from Birkner criterion merely 
serves as a method of applying the facts in specific circumstances. 808 
P.2d at 1040-41. The important requirement remains, whether the 
employee's conduct is motivated at least in part by the purpose of serving 
the employer's interests. Ld. at 1040. 
Because the second trip test focuses on travel away from the 
workplace, in cases where the employee remains substantially within the 
normally spatial boundaries of employment, the test provides little help.3 
For example, it makes no sense to ask whether the employer would have 
needed to send a second employee on a latrine break if the first employee 
had not made such a trip. This would be true whether the employee used 
a latrine on the premises, or one equally close but outside the physical 
boundaries of work.4 Similarly, in this case, Ms. Swenson's momentary 
break from work to pick up a cup of soup was such a slight departure from 
her work responsibilities, the second trip test does not make sense given 
the facts. Carter v. Bessev. 97 Utah 427, 93 P.2d 490, 492 (Utah 1939) ("A 
slight deviation from order or attending incidentally to other business than 
the master's, but which does not dissever the servant from the master's 
business does not relieve the master from liability for the servant's 
negligence."). 
3 Although the Clover court at first analyzed Mr. Zulliger's actions under the second trip test, 
it recognized that the case was better suited to the personal detour approach. 808 P.2d at 1042. 
4 Eugene Bezzant testified that Gate 4 lies equally distant from the Frontier Cafe and Lower 
Gate 4, which is the site of the nearest on-premise restroom facility. Bezzant Depo. at page 9, 
line 22 through page 10, line 13, attached as Addendum 4. 
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The critical inquiry remains whether Ms. Swenson was motivated at 
least in part, by the purpose of serving Defendant's interest. And, as the 
facts discussed in Point 2 above, illustrate-Ms. Swenson took her break at 
Burns convenience and in a way that at least partly served its needs. 
However, if another approach is merited, a better method for analyzing Ms. 
Swenson's conduct appears under the personal detour doctrine. Courts 
may follow this approach when the employee's activity does not involve a 
commute, as in Whitehead, or a journey away from work. 
In the personal detour approach, and under circumstances like this 
one, the court looks to see if in taking a personal detour away from work 
responsibilities the employee completely abandons his or her employment. 
Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Utah 1991). In this 
case, Ms. Swenson's own testimony reflects her belief about picking up the 
soup in relation to her work. Instead of viewing her decision to obtain the 
soup as abandoning work, she resolutely stated: "No. I was doing my job." 
(Swenson Depo. at 23, lines 16-19, Addendum 1).5 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set forth above, and those detailed in the Brief 
of Appellants, Mr. Christensen and Mr. Fausett respectfully requests the 
Court to overturn the lower court's grant of summary judgment. 
5 See also Brief of Appellant at Point 2C for a more detailed analysis of the personal detour 
approach as applied to the facts in this case. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
EXCERPTS OF GLORIA SWENSON'S DEPOSITION 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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your lunch; is that a fair assessment? 
A Yes. 
Q That was up to the guard to determine whether he or 
she would go off the premises and get the lunch or just bring 
their lunch in? 
MR. HARRIS: Objection. Leading. 
Q Do you understand the question? 
A Well, I can tell — what I can tell you, there is 
some days we had lunches, some days we did not. One or the 
other of us went for a cup of soup. That was our lunch. That's 
what you had time for. 
Q Sometimes the guard would bring his or her own lunch 
in; is that right? 
A Yes. A lot of time it was shared because you never 
got a break to have anything. 
Q Did you consider that if you chose to go across and 
get a cup of soup that you were on a personal errand? 
MR. HARRIS: That's leading again. 
A No. I was doing my job. 
Q Were you told to go get a cup of soup? 
A No, I was never told to go get a cup of soup. 
Q Did you consider that part of your — 
A But I know that you are entitled to a lunch hour. 
Q Okay. Let me ask you this. And you made the 
personal choice to go get a cup of soup, right? 
23 
Associated Merit ©*»««•« 
1 A I went for lunch, yes. 
2 Q And you were not directed to go get a cup of soup by 
3 anyone at Burns? 
4 A No. 
5 MR. HARRIS: Objection. Leading still. 
6 Q That was your personal choice, was it not? 
7 A I guess if you are hungry, that's your choice. 
8 Q Sure. And that wasn't part of your job description 
9 to go get a lunch at the Frontier, was it? 
10 MR. HARRIS: Same objection. Leading. 
11 A I don't know what you are reaching for other than — 
12 Q Just answer the question is all I'm asking. 
13 MR. HARRIS: If you don't understand the question, 
14 don't answer it. Have him reask it. 
15 A Reask it again. 
16 Q Was it your understanding that you had the personal 
17 choice to either bring your lunch in or to go off and get it? 
18 A Yes. 
19 MR. HARRIS: Objection. Leading. 
20 Q Tell me what you did from the time that you left to 
21 the time that you got involved in the accident. Tell me what 
22 happened. Just walk us through that sequentially. 
23 A I made a phone call over to have the cup of soup 
24 ready. That's what I had, one cup of soup. And I walked in 
25 picked it up. 
24 
ADDENDUM 2 
EXCERPTS OF KIM S. HANCEY'S DEPOSITION 
50 
gate? 
A Right. 
Q Under that circumstance, the rover comes over 
and sits there for 15 minutes while he takes his break or 
eats his lunch or smokes a cigarette? 
A No, nobody gets by. 
Q Exactly. Now, leaving that, we've already 
established that going to where you have two people at gate 
4, for example, I don't know that there's two people at 
uther posts, but gate 4 during a day shift when one person 
leaves and leaves at such a time to go on break, leaves at 
such a time that it ion't in violation of the shift change, 
they aren't needed over on the other ar*a# okay, when that 
person leaves for those 10 or 15 minutes and you still have 
the other person at gate 4, all right? 
A Okay. 
Q Under those circumstances, it is true, is it 
not, that your contract, your meaning Burns* contract, is 
being met with regards to Geneva Steel? 
A Yeah. 
Q Thank you. And you also agree, do you uot/ that 
it is important that employees are given a few aiinutea, 
we've talked about here, to have a break during the day? 
A Uh-huh, 
Q That's beneficial to the employee, obviously? 
mM*rTTF*T7.ED TRANSCRIPT 
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A Yes, it is. 
Q And it's always beneficial to Burns Security? 
A Yes-
Q Correct? 
A Uh-huh. 
Q And whether that break i s to re l i eve themselves 
or jus t get a breath of fresh a i r , whether i t ' s to eat , a l l 
those things are important to the individual and to Burns 
Security? 
A Yes, i t i s* 
Q Arp yftu familiar with any security employees, 
lieutenants or otherwise that have been disciplined for 
leaving the facility? 
m. WILLIAMS: That's asker! and answered. 
THE WITNESS: Excuse me 
MR- WILLIAMS: It's just an objection. I 
believe it's been asked and already answered. 
THE WITNESS; Yeah. 
Q (By Mr. Harris) My previous question was very 
limited with regards to the specifics of what Gloria did 
that day, where she was ^ ust gone a very few minutes over 
and back. I'm talking about — I'm not limiting my 
question to that. I'm talking about are you familiar with 
anyone who has been disciplined under your watches for 
leaving the facility? 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
ADDENDUM 3 
EXCERPTS OF MICHAEL TRANSTRUM'S DEPOSITION 
A Except as directed by specific instructions, 
that would be an exception. 
MR. HARRIS: Thank you. I also asked last 
time, I guess I need to write a letter to get it 
memorialized, because you and I may have forgotten 
about it, I wanted to see the guard reports for thirty 
days prior and the log book for thirty days prior. 
MR. WILLIAMS: We made that request and Mr. 
Transtrura indicates to me that he did look for that. 
THE WITNESS: I made an effort to find that. 
I do not know where that old log book would be. 
Q (By Mr. Harris) You can't find it at all? 
A No. I don't know as there was necessarily 
any provision to keep those for any period of time when 
they are filled up. I haven't kept them. 
Q A couple of follow up questions on breaks 
that I failed to ask you. We talked about what the 
general practice was about breaks, rest rooms, what I 
characterize as a coffee break, how long they took and 
how many of them there were. You would agree, do you 
not, that these types of breaks are necessary and 
beneficial to the employee? 
A Oh, absolutely. 
Q And they have got to have them? 
A Yes. 
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1 Q Whether they be relieving themselves or 
2 getting some nourishment, or just a few minutes of 
3 quiet time, it is helpful to the employee? 
4 A It would be helpful. 
5 Q And also the same question with regards to 
6 the employer, you also agree that having employees have 
7 these types of breaks to do the things that we have 
8 talked about were contained in the practice of Burns 
9 there at Geneva is also important to Burns Security? 
10 A Well, it is important that these people be 
11 comfortable while they are on the job, yes. 
12 Q And that allows them to perform their job 
13 adequately? 
u A I would.except that their break would be 
15 taken in such a manner that they can perform their job 
16 adequately, yes. 
17 Q And the fact that they would get a break 
18 would help them perform their job adequately? 
19 A I would say yes. 
20 Q It would help everything from their 
21 disposition to how they treat customers and the 
22 clients? 
23 A Yes, they are people and people do like 
24 breaks. 
25 Q And there is no question that there is some 
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1 I benefit to these breaks to Burns Security, the 
2 employer? 
3 A Yes. 
4 Q With regard to Oreon Olson, does he still 
5 work there at the plant? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q I mean at Burns Security? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q And does Jim Bezzant still work there? 
10 A Yes. 
11 MR. HARRIS: I would like to take both of 
12 their depositions, if I could. My understanding is 
13 Mark Nielson works for BMT and Ben Olson is retired. 
u THE WITNESS: That is true. 
15 MR. HARRIS: I have no further questions. 
16 EXAMINATION 
17 BY MR. WILLIAMS: Q I have just a few 
18 questions. Based on your knowledge and your current 
19 position as captain and as lieutenant when you first 
20 started in 1988, and upon your review of the Post 
21 Orders, did you have any understanding from that review 
22 of the Post Orders if the duties of a security guard 
23 included using his or her private or personal vehicle 
24 for Gate 4 for breaks in ordet to go off the plant 
site? 25 
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ADDENDUM 4 
EXCERPTS OF EUGENE S. BEZZANT'S DEPOSITION 
9 
Q Why not necessarily? 
A Because, I mean we can be off out of that building 
and down checking a steel load or some other problem. 
Q And how far would you be checking a steel load? 
A Could be as far as a quarter of a mile to half a 
mile. 
Q And so how long would you be away from the building 
itself? 
A It depends on what the problem is. 
Q Could it be as long as 30 minutes? 
A No, sir. 
Q As long as 20 minutes? 
A Possibly. 
Q So it could be as long as 20 minutes, but usually 
not as long as 30? 
A Generally. 
Q Do you know this gentleman who was just here whose 
deposition we just took? 
A Yes. 
Q That was Oreon Olsen? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Oreon said occasionally guards from gate four would 
have to go down to lower gate four. 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. How far is that? 
10 
A I would say four or 500 yards. I mean going by a 
block Ifd say a block at least, a city block. 
Q Is the Frontier Cafe a city block away from gate 
four? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Is it more than a city block? 
A No# sir* 
Q So itfs about the same as a city block? 
A That's correct, sir. 
Q It's about the same distance as going to lower gate 
four? 
A That's right. 
Q Did you have occasion to work gate four regularly 
during the summer months of 1988? 
A Yes-
Q Did you know Gloria Swenson at that time? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you consider her to be a good employee? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you consider her to be a good guard? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you have occasion to work in that little building 
next to gate four? 
A I don't understand the question, sir. 
Q Well, you said there was like a five by five little 
